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raised concerns that other countries would follow suit. This article examines how
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and peace issues could influence how citizens would vote in EU membership referen-
dums. Our two-wave survey experiment on a random sample of the German popula-
tion and difference-in-differences analysis revealed that only fears of being outvoted in
EU decision-making swayed German voters’ attitudes about EU membership, particu-
larly voters with weaker EU support, little EU knowledge and low levels of political
engagement. We therefore conclude that concerns about sovereignty loss can be
drivers of Euroscepticism even in a country that has vast influence over EU decisions.
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Introduction
The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) ‘Brexit’ referendum of 23 June 2016 was the first
time an electoral majority voted to leave the European Union (EU). This raised
concerns that other member states might put their EU membership to a public vote
and ultimately leave the union. Populist and right-wing parties have gained
momentum in many member states; these parties have questioned the integration
process and in some cases advocate EU membership referendums (see e.g.
Alternative for Germany, AfD, 2019: 12). It is therefore important to understand
what types of arguments in EU exit discussions can sway voters’ opinions about
EU membership and which voters are most susceptible to specific arguments in the
remaining member states.
Previous studies have shown how economic (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993;
Gabel, 1998a, 1998b; Gabel and Whitten, 1997) and cultural (e.g. Abbarno and
Zapryanova, 2013; Bruter, 2005; Carey, 2002; Kuhn, 2015; McLaren, 2002) factors
influence public support towards the EU. Furthermore, research on how country-
specific factors shape citizens’ views about European integration (e.g. De Vries,
2018; Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2000) has shown that citizens’ support for the EU is neg-
atively related to their evaluation of the quality of their national government and
economic conditions. However, prior studies have largely overlooked the stability
of EU attitudes (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 426). Existing research shows that
generally pro-EU arguments increase (and anti-EU arguments decrease) EU sup-
port (Abbarno and Zapryanova, 2013; Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Karstens, 2019;
Maier et al., 2012; Medrano, 2003; Schuck and De Vreese, 2006; Vliegenhart et al.,
2008). Yet, we know little about the conditions under which given arguments can
change EU public opinion, or whether specific arguments are more persuasive than
others.
Recently, Goodwin et al. (2020) proposed that the magnitude of framing effects
depends on their level of novelty in a given context. They analysed how pro-
Remain and pro-Leave arguments derived from the competing Brexit campaigns
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influenced the stability of public opinion in the UK. As predicted, they found that
a combination of positive arguments about EU membership had a greater poten-
tial to influence voters than a combination of negative arguments. They explained
this finding with the long tradition of Euroscepticism in the UK (Daddow, 2012;
Goodwin et al., 2020; Schmitt et al., 2008). According to this argument, pro-Leave
arguments had already been ‘priced in’ in people’s minds and therefore were too
commonplace to cause a change in opinion. By contrast, pro-EU arguments were
more novel and had a greater potential to sway voters’ opinions.
These findings suggest that the political context – and particularly the predom-
inant rhetoric in it – affects which arguments can change EU membership atti-
tudes. If this rationale is correct, it should hold in other contexts, too.
We examine this claim by investigating the effect of key pro- and anti-EU
membership arguments on vote intention in a hypothetical EU exit referendum
in Germany. This case presents a strong contrast to the UK, as Germany has
historically had one of the continent’s lowest levels of Euroscepticism (De Vries,
2018; Schmitt et al., 2008). Building on Goodwin et al. (2020), we expect that
negative arguments about the economic, cultural, political, and peace and security
aspects of European integration should have a greater potential to sway public
opinion on EU membership in Germany since they have been less common in the
discussion. This should hold especially for negative arguments about the political
or peace and security aspects of the country’s EU membership, which have typi-
cally been described in rather positive terms in the German discourse.
To further highlight the channels through which these arguments sway public
opinion, we investigate the potential of individual-level moderators to influence
the effectiveness of novel campaign messages. In particular, we look at how indi-
vidual biases and political predispositions interact with the treatment to sway
voters’ opinions.
To test our hypotheses, we designed a two-wave survey experiment within the
probability-based German Internet Panel (GIP). In both waves, we asked respond-
ents to indicate how they would vote if a referendum on Germany exiting the EU
(‘Dexit’) were held next Sunday. Before posing this question in the second wave,
we split respondents into nine groups. One group served as a control and received
no additional information, while the other eight groups received a single argument
for or against EU membership related to a central economic, cultural, political or
security and peace issue.
Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that, overall, negative arguments
do not have a stronger effect than positive arguments on respondents’ attitudes.
Yet, the analysis reveals that negative political arguments have a statistically sig-
nificant effect on vote intentions. We find that a concern about sovereignty loss –
i.e. the possibility that Germany could be outvoted at the EU level, and that other
countries’ interests could be imposed on Germany – has a statistically significant
negative effect on voters’ support for EU membership and can sway their attitudes
towards leaving the union.1 The negative political argument decreased the share of
respondents in favour of remaining in the EU from 85% to 81%, despite the
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observed, general trend towards increasing support for remaining in the EU over
time. While this is a significant and substantial effect, an overwhelming majority of
respondents exposed to the negative political argument continued to support
remaining in the EU.
Additionally, as expected, we show that citizens with weak priors – i.e. those
with low levels of EU knowledge and low political engagement – are more likely to
be persuaded or framed by the negative political argument. Moreover, in line with
previous studies on perceptual biases, we find that voters tend to give greater
weight to information that confirms their prior beliefs and predispositions (Ditto
et al., 1998; McDonald and Hirt, 1997; Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987). Thus,
voters who already have negative predispositions towards the EU are more sus-
ceptible to the negative political framing than those who are positively predisposed
towards the union.
Our findings suggest that the EU’s majoritarian decision-making procedures
have political costs within member states. These costs could potentially call
into question the sustainability and future of European integration. In particular,
the goal of an ever-closer union often necessitates compromises and a loss of
sovereignty. This process creates winners and losers, and may further increase
Euroscepticism.
Theoretical expectations
Media and politicians can choose what information to present – and how to pre-
sent it. They can highlight different aspects, or reframe the discussion.
Subsequently, an individual’s exposure to a given argument can influence his or
her attitudes through two mechanisms: (1) it may make new information (an
unknown argument) available to them (known as the persuasion effect) or (2) it
may make information that was already available (a known argument) more easily
accessible in their mind (known as the framing effect) (Lenz, 2009). We build upon
prior research on persuasion and framing to investigate whether (and how) various
arguments about the EU can change German voters’ attitudes about staying in or
leaving the union. We are interested in the overall impact of a given argument on
voters’ opinion, whether this influence is due to persuasion or framing.
The literature on voters’ attitudes towards European integration has generally
shown that positive (negative) information and arguments increase (decrease)
voters’ support for integration (Abbarno and Zapryanova, 2013; Gabel and
Scheve, 2007; Maier et al., 2012; Medrano, 2003; Schuck and De Vreese, 2006;
Vliegenhart et al., 2008). More recent research highlights that the (political) con-
text affects the magnitude of the framing and persuasion effects (Goodwin et al.,
2020). Arguments that have been more dominant in a given context are likely to
have been ‘priced in’ to voters’ opinions. Therefore, exposure to these arguments
should have a weaker effect than exposure to new arguments. Indeed, Goodwin
et al. (2020) show that positive frames about EU integration had a greater poten-
tial to affect voting in the Brexit referendum. They proposed that this difference
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was caused by the fact that negative arguments have dominated public discussions
in the UK for decades.
We extend the literature by exploring the proposition that unknown or less
familiar arguments should have a stronger potential to sway public opinion,
using the case of Germany. Given Germany’s long tradition of EU approval
and support for integration (De Vries, 2018; Schmitt et al., 2008), positive argu-
ments about membership should have been more easily accessible to voters than
negative ones. We therefore expect to find that:
H1a: Negative arguments about the EU affect EU-exit vote intentions more than
positive arguments.
Moreover, German voters are likely to be more familiar with some negative argu-
ments about the EU than with others. While the economic and cultural aspects of
the union have arguably been more divisive, historically, political and peace/secu-
rity aspects of the EU have been described in positive terms in Germany. On the
one hand, the political aspect has been perceived favourably because Germans
have had little reason to fear a loss of sovereignty or self-determination. As the
largest EU member state, Germany is often perceived to be taking a leading role in
the union, rather than being unable to assert its interests in EU decisions (De Vries,
2020). On the other hand, the preservation of peace in Europe was a key reason for
the creation of the European Community, and for Germany to join as a founding
member (Dinan, 2004). Indeed, the half-century of peace on the European conti-
nent following European integration is remarkable in light of the world wars. The
EU’s Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 reinforced its image as a peace-keeper despite its
rather limited powers in foreign and security policies. Thus, we expect negative
considerations about a loss of sovereignty or peace/security to be new to German
voters – and thus to have a greater potential to sway their attitudes towards the EU
than other, more familiar negative considerations.
H1b: Negative arguments about political and peace/security aspects of European
integration affect EU-exit vote intentions more than negative arguments about eco-
nomic and cultural aspects.
Notably, negative arguments related to political and peace/security considerations
are not purely hypothetical. They are attracting an increasing amount of attention,
and are likely to become more and more important in the near future. These
considerations directly affect recent initiatives to strengthen EU foreign policy –
e.g. EU army plans, common economic sanctions against Russia after its annex-
ation of Crimea, tightening EU border controls in the aftermath of the refugee
influx and terrorist attacks in EU cities – and have heightened disagreements
between and within member states over such collective political decisions. This
makes our study of such considerations timely. This article will also add to the
broader literature on EU public opinion, which has extensively studied how
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citizens’ trust in (and support for) national and EU institutions influences their
attitudes towards the union (e.g. Armingeon and Ceka, 2013; De Vries, 2018;
Rohrschneider, 2002; Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2000), but so far has paid limited attention
to the role of political and security concerns in shaping EU attitudes.2
Furthermore, we expect that some individuals will be more susceptible to fram-
ing or persuasion with novel, less common or forgotten arguments than others,
either due to rational mechanisms or because of individual biases (De Vries and
Edwards, 2009; Hobolt, 2007; Maier et al., 2012). According to a Bayesian rational
perspective, strong priors will limit the effect of belief or attitude updates after
receiving new information, while weak priors should increase the probability that
new information will impact preferences (e.g. Bullock, 2009). Therefore, individu-
als who do not already have a clear stance or pronounced opinion should be more
receptive to persuasion and framing. We expect that individuals with moderate
predispositions towards the EU (i.e. those with neither extremely positive nor
extremely negative EU attitudes) are more likely to be affected by our arguments.
The same holds for people who are generally less politically engaged and those
with low political knowledge, since they are less likely to hold crystallized beliefs or
to have strong priors (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Schuck and De Vreese, 2006).
Accordingly, we hypothesise that:
H2: Arguments about the EU have a stronger impact on EU-exit vote intentions of
individuals with moderate predispositions towards the EU (a), individuals with little
political engagement (b) and individuals with low EU knowledge (c).
Prior beliefs may not weaken the framing and persuasion effects of less familiar
arguments, but instead serve as a filter when individuals are processing new infor-
mation (Bartels, 2002; Evans and Andersen, 2006; Goodwin et al., 2020; Tesler,
2015; Tilley et al., 2008). Arguably, people do not simply absorb all available
information, but seek to reconcile or interpret it in a way that is consistent with
their prior beliefs and predispositions (Nickerson, 1998; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011).
In particular, people tend to avoid, disregard or downplay information that con-
flicts with their existing beliefs (‘disconfirmation bias’) (Edwards and Smith, 1996).
At the same time, they easily accept and give greater weight to information that
confirms or is consistent with their prior opinions, beliefs and directional motiva-
tions (‘confirmation bias’) (Ditto et al., 1998; Kunda, 1990; McDonald and Hirt,
1997; Nickerson, 1998; Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987). Consequently, they
consider information that is consistent with their prior beliefs to be more convinc-
ing than anti-attitudinal information (Taber and Lodge, 2006).
People’s prior beliefs are often associated with their ideological preferences and
partisan affiliations (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). One’s party affinity produces a
‘perceptual lens’. This in-group bias leads voters to discount or disregard new
information that conflicts with their party’s stance (Bartels, 2002; Bolsen et al.,
2014; Bullock, 2011; Druckman et al., 2013; Jerit and Barabas, 2012; Slothuus and
De Vreese, 2010; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011). We therefore expect that:
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H3: Negative (positive) arguments about the EU have a stronger impact on EU-exit
vote intentions of individuals predisposed against (in favour of) the EU (a) and
individuals supporting anti-EU (pro-EU) parties (b).
Survey experiment set-up
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a two-wave survey experiment within the
GIP waves of July 2016 (Blom et al., 2017a) and March 2017 (Blom et al., 2017b).
The GIP maintains a probability-based sample of the German population aged
between 16 and 75 years that was recruited offline using face-to-face interviews
(Blom et al., 2015). The GIP provided computers with internet access for partic-
ipants if needed, thus ensuring that their sample is representative of both the online
and offline German population (Blom et al., 2015). Our original sample consisted
of 2800 respondents, 80% of whom completed both waves.
In both waves, we asked respondents how they would vote in a hypothetical
referendum on Germany’s EU membership. In the second wave, we randomly
divided the respondents into one control and eight treatment groups of approxi-
mately 300 respondents each.3 Immediately before the EU membership question in
the second wave, respondents in the treatment groups were shown a single argu-
ment either in favour of or against EU membership. The control group received
the EU membership question with no additional information.
Unlike Goodwin et al. (2020), we do not use arguments drawn from an ongoing
political campaign, as the possibility of a referendum on EU membership in
Germany is purely hypothetical. Therefore, we focused on key aspects of the
European integration project and develop general arguments for and against EU
membership based on the history and current state of the union. The EU has its
roots in organisations created in the aftermath of World War II with the explicit
goal to foster economic cooperation and interdependence in order to maintain
peace and security on the continent. European integration has introduced the
free movement of goods, capital and services throughout the union. It also ensures
the free movement of people to travel, study, work and live in any other EU
country. Member states have yielded significant power to the union, but all of
them have a say in its decisions.
Some may thus associate EU membership with economic benefits, cultural
diversity and exchanges, peace and security, and/or political influence within EU
bodies and over EU decisions. Conversely, others may view EU membership as
entailing economic costs, cultural threats, security threats and/or national sover-
eignty loss. We therefore presented our survey respondents with a single economic,
cultural, political or peace/security-related argument either for or against EU mem-
bership, as summarised in Table 1 (the full text of each argument is available in the
Online appendix).
Our research design has two important features that could be related to lower
effect sizes. First, to establish which arguments can change EU exit attitudes, we
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exposed our respondents to one, rather than a combination of positive or negative
arguments, as in Goodwin et al. (2020). This makes it more difficult to observe
significant changes in EU exit attitudes, as the amount of information in each
treatment is reduced. Second, we study vote choice in a hypothetical EU exit ref-
erendum. This setting makes the choice less salient, which again could reduce the
effect of a given treatment. However, we have no reason to expect that the hypo-
thetical nature of the referendum would affect the impact of one treatment differ-
ently than any of the other treatments. Even if it did, our difference-in-differences
design should correct for this effect.
Our two-wave panel design allows us to compare EU membership support
before (wave 1) and after (wave 2) exposure to arguments within subjects. We
compare the average change in EU membership support between the two waves
in the control group (which did not receive any arguments) with the average change
in EU membership support in (each of) the eight treatments groups (which
received either a positive or a negative argument). This difference-in-differences
design allows us to isolate the effect of a treatment (a positive or a negative argu-
ment) from any general trends between the two waves.
Our dependent variable measures the change in support for Germany remaining
in the EU from wave 1 (GIP wave 24) to wave 2 (GIP wave 28). Respondents in
both waves were asked ‘If a vote on Germany’s EU membership took place next
Sunday, how would you vote?’ and were presented with the following answer catego-
ries: ‘Remain’, ‘Leave’, ‘Don’t know’, ‘I won’t vote’, ‘I’m not eligible to vote (not of
age or no German citizenship)’ and ‘I don’t want to say’.4 We used the former three
answer categories to construct our dependent variables, and coded the latter three as
missing cases. The dependent variable DRemain is the difference between a dummy
variable capturing the intention to vote Remain in wave 2 and a dummy variable
Table 1. Summary of the eight positive and negative treatments.
Aspect Framing Treatment
Economy Positive: The German economy benefits from the EU’s common market.
Negative: EU exit would allow Germany to support its own, rather than other
states’, poor citizens/regions.
Culture Positive: EU citizens have the unlimited right to travel, study, work and live any-
where in the EU.
Negative: EU exit would allow Germany to preserve its cultural values and norms.
Political Positive: EU membership allows Germany to shape the EU’s decisions.
decisions Negative: In the EU, Germany can be outvoted; EU exit would allow Germany to
make decisions autonomously.
Peace/ Positive: EU membership fosters peace and security in Europe.
Security Negative: EU exit would allow better protection of the German border.
Note: Full treatment texts in German and English can be found in the Online appendix.
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capturing the intention to vote Remain in wave 1. It equals 1 if participants changed
their vote intention from either ‘Leave’ or ‘Don’t know’ to ‘Remain’, 0 if there was
no change to or away from ‘Remain’,5 and –1 if the participants changed their vote
intention from ‘Remain’ to either ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Leave’ between the two waves.
Thus, our dependent variable is identical to the one used by Goodwin et al. (2020)
and captures whether a treatment makes respondents more or less likely to vote
Remain.6 The mean of the dependent variable captures the percentage point change
in the Remain vote between the two survey waves, as it corresponds to the difference
in the percentage of voters supporting Remain in wave 2 and the percentage of
voters supporting Remain in wave 1 (see the Online appendix for further explana-
tion). This feature of the dependent variable facilitates the interpretation of the
substantive regression results in the next section.
Note that the treatments cannot make voters who already wanted Germany to
leave/remain in the EU in wave 1 want that even more in wave 2. This makes it
more difficult to observe significant effects, particularly towards the dominant
choice of voting Remain.
Analysis
This section presents the analysis and results. We use regression analyses and F-
tests to assess our hypotheses in turn.
Positive versus negative arguments
We first analyse hypothesis 1a. To establish whether treatment with negative argu-
ments about the EU has a stronger effect on EU exit attitudes than treatment with
positive arguments, as expected due to the relative novelty of the former, we run an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression based on the following equation:
DRemaini ¼ aþ b1  Positivei þ b2  Negativei þ i (1)
where i indexes individual respondents. DRemaini is the change in support for
Germany remaining in the EU from wave 1 to wave 2 (see above); Positive is a
binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent received any positive argument in
wave 2 and 0 if he or she was in the control group. Negative equals 1 if the
respondent received any negative argument in wave 2 and 0 if he or she was in
the control group. The coefficient estimates b thus capture how the average change
in support for remaining in the EU between the two waves is affected by exposure
to the treatment (i.e. a positive or a negative argument) compared to the control
group (i.e. no argument). Negative (positive) values indicate that respondents who
received a treatment (positive or negative) decreased (increased) their EU mem-
bership support by b units more than those who did not (control group). We use
OLS to maintain comparability to Goodwin et al. (2020) and for ease of interpre-
tation. Furthermore, given the setup of the experiment, we expect the substantive
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differences between OLS estimates and ordered logit regression estimates to be
small (Angrist and Pischke, 2008: 94–99). In fact, in the Online appendix, we show
that our results remain substantively the same in both statistical models.
These difference-in-differences estimates, alongside their 95% confidence inter-
vals (CIs), are displayed in the top two bars in Figure 1(a) (see the Online appendix
for the full regression table).7 The results indicate no statistically significant effect
of exposure to either positive or negative arguments. Furthermore, the difference
between the two effects, displayed in the bottom bar of Figure 1(a), is not signif-
icant.8 Hence, we do not find evidence to support hypothesis 1a, i.e. we do not find
that negative arguments about the EU have a stronger potential to sway attitudes
about EU exit than positive arguments.
Stronger effects of less familiar negative arguments?
Hypothesis 1b predicts that exposure to less familiar negative arguments about the
EU (related to negative political or peace/security aspects of European integration)
will have a stronger effect on EU exit attitudes than more familiar negative argu-
ments (related to negative economic or cultural aspects). To test this hypothesis,
we run the following regression:
DRemaini ¼ aþ b1  Positive Political Peacei
þ b2  Negative Political Peacei
þ b3  Positive Cultural Economici
þ b4  Negative Cultural Economici þ i
(2)
We incorporate four binary variables to measure the causal effects of receiving
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise): (a) a positive political or peace/security argument; (b) a
negative political or peace/security argument; (c) a positive cultural or economic
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Coefficients and 95% CIs of the OLS regressions on the change in support for
remaining in the EU between waves 1 and 2 in the treated groups versus the control group. (a) All
positive versus all negative treatments. (b) Negative political and peace arguments versus negative
cultural and economic arguments.
Note: The bottom row shows the difference between the two coefficients in a sample of 1000
draws from the regression’s sampling distribution, and the corresponding 95% CI. The corre-
sponding regression tables are presented in the Online appendix.
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argument; (d) a negative cultural or economic argument. The coefficients
are interpreted the same way as in the previous subsection. Finding a stronger
effect of treatment with a negative political or peace/security argument than
treatment with a negative cultural or economic argument would offer support
for hypothesis 1b.
The results, displayed in Figure 1(b), indicate exactly that (see also the Online
appendix). Of the four effects tested in the regression, only exposure to a negative
political or peace/security argument significantly changed preferences for remain-
ing in the EU. Relative to the change in support for Remain in the control group,
exposure to a negative political or peace/security argument produced on average a
5.1 percentage point decrease in support for remaining in the EU. Moreover, the
F-test (p¼ 0.021) confirms that exposure to a negative political or peace/security-
related argument has a significantly stronger negative effect on the Remain vote
than exposure to a negative cultural or economic argument.
To examine whether this result is driven by any particular negative argument,
we use a pairwise approach to compare the effects of single negative arguments (see
the Online appendix). Figure 2(a) shows that only exposure to the negative polit-
ical argument significantly decreases support for remaining in the EU. This effect is
significantly different from the effects of the other three negative treatments, as our
F-tests (summarised in Figure 2(b)) show.
We find partial support for hypothesis 1b: treatment with the negative peace
and security argument has no independent effect compared to treatment with the
negative political argument. This may be explained by events that unfolded around
the time of the survey. Historically, negative peace and security arguments have
been less pronounced in Germany. However, the influx of refugees in 2015, mass
sexual harassments during 2015/2016 New Year’s Eve celebrations in multiple
German cities, and the terrorist attack in December 2016 at the Berlin
Christmas market raised public concerns about security issues (Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 2016a, 2016b; The Economist, 2015, 2016a, 2016b). These
events also drew public attention to the security challenges within the EU, which
are complicated by the Schengen policy of open borders between member states
(The Economist, 2015).
In contrast, those who were exposed to the argument that Germany can be
outvoted at the EU level and other states’ interests can be imposed on Germany
significantly lowered their support for remaining in the EU compared to the con-
trol group. Relative to the change in support for Remain in the control group,
exposure to this argument produced on average an 8.1 percentage point decrease in
support for remaining in the EU. This effect is also clearly visible in simple descrip-
tive statistics. For example, consider the changes in the share of remainers, leavers
and unsure voters across the treatment and control groups between the two waves
presented in Figure 3. The effect of our negative political frame is in line with our
expectations: the share of remainers decreased from 85.4% to 81.0% after receiv-
ing the negative political argument (indicated by the bold line in the left plot in
Figure 3). In contrast, the share of remainers in the control group increased from
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81.7% to 85.4%. Similarly, the share of leavers and unsure voters who received the
negative political treatment increased compared to the control group (see the bold
line in the middle and right plots in Figure 3). Overall, the effect of exposure to the
negative political treatment runs counter to the general trend of increased share of
remainers and a decreased share of leavers between the waves (see e.g. the lines for
the control group in Figure 3).
We rerun our analyses using two alternative dependent variables – DLeave and
DDon’t know – defined analogous to DRemaini (see the Online appendix). We find
that the negative political argument has a statistically significant positive effect on
DLeave, which is consistent with our main findings. This argument also has a
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Figure 2. Comparison of negative treatments’ effect sizes. (a) Coefficients and 95% CIs of the
OLS regressions on change in support for remaining in the EU between waves in a treatment
versus the control group (see the Online appendix). (b) Summary of statistical tests of differences
between coefficients of different negative treatments.
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positive impact on DDon’t know, although it fails to reach conventional levels of
significance. Our results are also robust to different model specifications, such as
using ordered logistic regressions instead of OLS regressions or an alternative
difference-in-differences specification using the raw survey responses (Leave¼ –1,
Don’t know¼ 0, Remain¼ 1) from both waves to measure the dependent variable
and interactions of each treatment with a wave dummy as the main covariate (see
the Online appendix).
Conditioning effects of individual characteristics and political predispositions
This section investigates whether the persuasion and framing effects of novel argu-
ments depend on individual characteristics as well as prior political predispositions
– i.e. whether respondents hold an extreme stance towards the EU, whether they
are politically engaged and whether they are knowledgeable about the EU (hypoth-
eses 2a to 2c) as well as whether they hold an anti-EU attitude or are supporters of
a Eurosceptic party (hypotheses 3a and 3b). Descriptive statistics on sub-group
sizes are reported in the Online appendix.
To test our conditional hypotheses 2 and 3, we ran regression models for each
treatment group and hypothesised respondent characteristic. We ran 40 models in
total (8 treatment groups 5 characteristics) on samples of one treatment group
plus the control group. The regressions are specified as follows:
DRemaini ¼ aþ b1  Treatmenti
þ b2  Respondent Characteristici
þ b3  Treatmenti  Respondent Characteristici þ i
(3)
where Treatment is an indicator variable for one of the eight treatment groups
(which equals 1 if the respondent received that treatment and 0 otherwise) and
Respondent_Characteristic (which equals 1 if the respondent has a given charac-
teristic and 0 otherwise) is an indicator variable for one of the five characteristics
with an expected conditioning effect based on hypotheses 2a to 2c and 3a and 3b,
respectively.
We operationalised respondents’ characteristics as follows. To capture the
strength of their predisposition towards the EU (see hypothesis 2a), we asked
respondents how they generally felt about the EU on a five-point scale. The
middle answer categories ‘mostly negatively’, ‘neither negatively nor positively’
and ‘mostly positively’ capture EU Moderate views, while the categories ‘very
negatively’ and ‘very positively’ capture more extreme views (EU Extremist).
We used answers to the classical vote intention question to create an indicator
variable for political engagement (hypothesis 2b). Respondents were asked to indi-
cate which party, if any, they would vote for if general elections were held in
Germany this Sunday. We consider those who indicated they would vote for a
particular party to be politically Engaged, and the rest (who do not intend to vote,
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refused an answer or do not know) as politically Disengaged. We treated respond-
ents who are not eligible to vote as missing cases.
We created a variable on low EU knowledge (hypothesis 2c) based on a
question asking respondents to indicate how well they understand the EU
decision-making process on a scale from 1 (very well) to 10 (not at all). We
coded respondents who chose a number above 5 as Not EU Knowledgeable, and
the rest as EU Knowledgeable. ‘Don’t know’ answers were treated as missing cases.
To capture voters’ predispositions (see hypotheses 3a and 3b), we relied on
information from the EU attitudes and voting intention questions. We coded
respondents as against the EU (or as having No Pro-EU Attitude) when they gen-
erally felt ‘mostly negatively’ or ‘very negatively’ towards the EU. The reference
category includes respondents who view the EU ‘mostly positively’ or ‘very posi-
tively’, i.e. those with a Pro-EU Attitude. Furthermore, respondents who indicated
that they would vote for Die Linke, AfD or the National Democratic Party of
Germany (NPD) were coded as supporters of an anti-EU party (Eurosceptic Party
Supporters) (following the classifications by Treib (2015) and Hobolt (2015)). They
are compared to those who indicated they would vote for a pro-EU party (Gru¨ne,
Social Democratic Party (SPD), Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social
Union (CDU/CSU), Free Democratic Party (FDP) or Pirate Party), i.e. Not
Eurosceptic Party Supporters.
Figure 4 summarises the results of the 40 regression models (see also the Online
appendix). As an example, consider the model in the top left corner of Figure 4.
The analyses are based on all respondents from the group who received the positive
political argument (þPolitical) and all respondents from the control group. In the
first three lines of the left column of Figure 4, the dots represent (in order) (a) the
average change in support for remaining in the EU after treatment with the pos-
itive political statement for respondents with extreme EU stances (EU Extremist),
(b) the average change in support for remaining in the EU after treatment with the
positive political statement for respondents with moderate EU stances (EU
Moderate) and (c) the difference in the two effects, i.e. the size of the interaction
effect (b3 in equation (3)). The figure also displays the 95% CIs around each
estimate: if this interval includes zero, the respective effect is not significant. A
significant effect of any of the characteristics’ coefficients (when black lines in
Figure 4 do not cover zero) implies that the treatment has an effect in a given
group that is statistically distinguishable from zero. A statistically significant inter-
action effect (when the grey lines in Figure 4 do not cover zero) indicates a statis-
tically significant difference in effect sizes between the two groups.
We find significant conditional effects of individual characteristics only for the
negative political treatment (–Political). In other words, even in these sub-samples,
only the negative political treatment has a statistically significant effect on
respondents’ vote choices (in some subgroups).9 Hypotheses 2a to 2c expect stron-
ger persuasion and framing effects of novel arguments for people without strong
priors. Contrary to hypothesis 2a, we find no significant differences between the
effect sizes of the negative political treatment in the EU Extremist and EU
14 European Union Politics 0(0)
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Moderate subgroups. Yet, in line with hypothesis 2b, we find that the negative
political treatment affects Disengaged voters significantly more than Engaged
voters, as shown by the statistically significant negative coefficient of the
interaction effect (grey dot and line in Figure 4’s second block in the second
column). Further, we demonstrate that voters with little EU knowledge (Not EU
Knowledgeable) are significantly more affected by the negative political treatment
than EU Knowledgeable voters (results in the third block of the second column of
Figure 4). This finding supports hypothesis 2c. Overall, we find evidence that past
biases decrease susceptibility to novel frames, but it is not consistent.
The results are also inconclusive with respect to the (dis)confirmation bias
hypotheses (hypotheses 3a and 3b). Exposure to the negative political treatment
significantly decreased support for remaining in the EU for those who were less
supportive of the EU (No Pro-EU Attitude), but it had no significant impact on
respondents with a Pro-EU Attitude (black lines in the fourth block of the second
column). The difference between these two effects is statistically significant and
corroborates hypothesis 3a. At the same time, contrary to hypothesis 3b, the
bottom block of the second column in Figure 4 shows that there is no significant
difference in how the negative political treatment affected those who were
Eurosceptic Party Supporters and those who were not. Overall, we find mixed
evidence for the hypotheses that strong priors and (dis)confirmation bias condition
the persuasion and framing effects of novel arguments in a consistent or predict-
able fashion.
Discussion
This article analysed whether (and when) eight arguments for or against the EU can
shift vote intentions on a hypothetical German EU exit (‘Dexit’) referendum. We
conducted a two-wave survey experiment on a random representative sample of the
German population. Our difference-in-differences analysis of respondents’ vote
intentions reveals that, in a context with strong public support for the EU, negative
arguments, in general, do not have a stronger impact than positive ones on voters’
attitudes towards Germany’s EU membership. However, we find that a negative
political argument that highlights the possibility that Germany’s interests can be
overruled in the EU has a statistically significant negative effect on voters’ support
for EU membership. One in 20 remainers who were exposed to that argument
became so much more sceptical as to support exit of their country from the EU if
a membership referendum were held next Sunday – the opposite was true for the
control group, where the Remain vote increased between wave 1 and wave 2. This is
a remarkable treatment effect given that we prompted respondents with just a single
short argument. It is even more remarkable given that we asked them to choose
between their country remaining in the EU and leaving it. This reflects a fundamen-
tal attitude, and we expect that the effect would have been stronger if we had asked
respondents about their general evaluation of their country’s EU membership or
support for (further) European integration. Notably, despite the significant effect of
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the negative political frame, the vast majority of citizens exposed to it remained
supportive of continued EU membership.
As predicted, the negative political argument had the strongest effect on citizens
with weaker prior biases (politically disengaged and less knowledgeable about the
EU) and those with congruent pre-existing attitudes against the EU (those with
strong anti-EU attitudes). This is in line with theories of voters’ information proc-
essing. Contrary to expectations, we find no individual effects of the remaining
negative and positive cultural, economic or peace/security-related arguments on
support for EU membership.
Our results have important implications for the current debate about
Euroscepticism and the future of European integration. While voters might sup-
port European integration in general, the resulting loss in sovereignty and the
possibility that undesired policies may be imposed can sway the opinion of some
citizens towards leaving the EU, even in Germany. While the trade-off between EU
integration and sovereignty loss has been a concern in the media, political debates
and the scholarly literature (e.g. Hix and Hagemann, 2015; Marks et al., 2002;
Thomson et al., 2006), our study offers empirical evidence that sovereignty loss
considerations can decrease support for European integration. Our findings there-
fore highlight the political cost of majoritarian decision-making procedures at the
EU level and suggest that policy-makers need to address concerns about sover-
eignty loss if they seek to maintain support for European integration.
A promising avenue for future research is to study the effect of sovereignty loss
frames on voters in different institutional and political contexts. Smaller member
states are a particularly interesting case. While sovereignty loss concerns could be
more pronounced in these countries because they have lower voting weights in the
Council, sovereignty loss frames could still be less important, as smaller countries
benefit more from access to the common market and combined political power on
the world stage. Furthermore, future studies could explore how arguments related
to sovereignty loss or power-sharing influence public opinion in other contexts
such as international treaties, trade and investment, or even coalition governments
(e.g. Elkins et al., 2006; Fortunato, 2019; Hahm et al., 2019; Harbridge and
Malhotra, 2011). We hope our findings will encourage future research on public
opinion and support for cooperation at the international and national levels.
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Notes
1. Even in Germany, the country with the most voting power in the EU, concerns about
being outvoted and a resultant loss in sovereignty are not trivial (Hix and Hagemann,
2015). Frantescu (2017) reports that Germany is outvoted in the EU Council far more
often than France and Italy, and suggests that Germany may frequently be on the losing
side post-Brexit as well.
2. For an exception, see De Vries (2020). Based on a survey experiment from July 2017, De
Vries (2020) show that reminding people of the devastation of World War II increases
their willingness to provide financial support to other member states in economic trouble.
3. See the Online appendix for information on the size of the treatment and control groups,
power calculations and randomisation checks.
4. The original text of the survey questions and their translations can be found in the Online
appendix.
5. This includes the following options: if the participants did not change their vote intention
or switched from ‘Leave’ to ‘Don’t know’ or from ‘Don’t know’ to ‘Leave’.
6. In the Online appendix, we also show that our substantive results are unchanged if we use
DLeave or DDon’t Know which are analogous to DRemain.
7. The results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls for gender, region, level of
education, age group, general EU attitudes, support for a Eurosceptic party and left–
right self-placement.
8. To estimate the difference between the effects of positive and negative treatments, we first
conducted a simple F-test that compares the coefficients b1 and b2 in equation (1). This
test finds no differences (p¼ 0.57). For Figure 1(a) we draw each coefficient 1000 times
from the coefficients’ ex post joined sampling distribution. The difference shown is the
mean difference between the two effects across these 1000 draws. The bounds of the CI
are the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the distribution of differences, respectively.
9. In line with hypothesis 3a, we also find a statistically significant difference in how the
negative economic treatment (–Economic) affects pro-EU voters relative to EU-sceptic
voters (see Figure 4, fourth block in column 6). However, the effects within each group
are either statistically insignificant or are only significant at the 10% level (see the Online
appendix).
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